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ABSTRACT 
The Paradox of Success: 
The Role of Capital Markets In Determining British Policy 
Toward the European Common Currency, 1979-1996. (April 2001) 
Caton Montgomery Walker 
Departments of Economics and Political Science 
Texas A&M University 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. John D. Robertson 
Department of Political Science 
That Britain, one of Europe's largest economies, has opted not to adopt the European 
common currency (Euro) has puzzled students of the European Union for some time. As recent 
referenda demonstrate, Britons remain mysteriously cautious of monetary integration with 
mainland Europe. Though existing literature oflen attributes Britons' Euro-skepticism to 
nationalism or xenophobia, fcw have examined the role of economic concerns in determimng 
British attitudes toward the Euro. Drawing on methodology developed by Perry and Robertson 
(2000), this study examines the role of capital markets in determming British attitudes toward 
the Euro. Specifically, using annual Furo-baromctcr and exchange rate data over the period 
1979-1996, this study exanunes whether the l. uro-Pound exchange rate plays a role m creating a 
pro- or anti-Euro political environment in Bntam Based on thi: assumption that, ceteris panbus, 
a pro-Euro political environment will likely result in pro-Euro policy, this study enables us to 
assess thc effect of exchange rates on British policy toward the common currency. The study 
finds that, indeed, exchange rates do help shape thc Bntish political landscape — as the Euro 
flounders, British opinion toward the Furo sours; when the Euro outperforms the British Pound, 
Bntons tend to acquiesce toward the notion of monetary mtegration. 
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Introduction 
With the official introduction of the European common currency (Euro) to the 
world's capital markets in 1999, Europe attained an unprecedented level of economic 
cohesion. In many ways, the Euro shall enable much of Europe to function as one large 
economy similar in scale to the United States. More importantly, the Euro's 
introduction also signalled a significant power shift in the world's monetary exchange 
markets, for the Euro represents the first threat in nearly a century to the United States 
dollar as the globe's most widely circulated currency. Indeed, since the dollar usurped 
the British Pound Sterling in the early twentieth century, the dollar has, by far, enjoyed a 
position as the most widely held currency. Today, the Euro — whose members currently 
include ten of the continent's largest economies — stands to soon make the economically 
cohesive Europe a monetary powerhouse. 
However, many find it particularly curious that one of Europe's largest 
economies has, for the time being, opted not to adopt the Euro. Though many argue that 
the 1996 electoral success of Tony Blair's Labour party accelerated the United 
Kingdom's seemingly inevitable monetary convergence with mainland Europe, most 
Britons express rcscrvations at accepting the common currency; as recent referenda 
demonstrate, Brttons remain mysteriously cautious of increased economic integration. 
Britain's apparent Euro-skepticism has proven particularly vexing for many students of 
thc European Union (EU). In particular, it seems that Britons have rejected their 
symbiotic relationship with the mainland; considering that trade with the mainland 
This thesis follou's the style and format suggested by the Modern Language Association (MLA) of 
America 
represents nearly 60'/ii (Monticelli and Papa, 1996, p. 9) of Britain's international trade, 
Britons' disinterest in the Euro reflects a subtle affront to the mainland's economic 
goals. Indeed, one may argue that Britain must adopt the Euro in order to avoid 
becoming a monetary has-been; similarly, the eventual success of the Euro may depend 
on whether it is adopted by Britain's large economy. 
Naturally, Britain's aversion to the Euro raises an important question: Why do 
Britons seem so averse to adopting the Euro? Perhaps surprisingly, existing literature 
offers little empirical analysis of Britain's apparent distaste for Europe's common 
currency. Of the literature that does address the phenomenon, most attribute Britain' s 
Euro-skepticism to nationalism. For instance, Anderson and Kaltenthalcr (199g) claim 
that most Britons equate monetary convergence with a ". . . substantial loss of national 
sovereignty. " (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 1998, p. 1) Relying on nationalism to explain 
aversion to the Euro, one may surmise that many Britons simply prcfcr legal tender that 
sports the Queen's image. Others carry the notion of nationalism a step further, 
attributing British Euro-skepticism to outright xenophobia (Whitten and Bohrer, 1997, p. 
2). Apparently, Britons fear foreign currency in much the same way one may fear 
foreign people. 
However, neither nationalism nor xenophobia seems a sufficient — or even 
probable — explanation of Britain*s aversion to monetary convergence. Switzerland — a 
nation without even a national language — has pursued even less integration with its 
European neighbors than Britain, yet no reasonable student of the European Union 
would attribute Switzerland's rcjcction of EU membership to simple nationalism. 
Rather, most ascribe Switzerland's relative isolationism to economic concerns. Given 
Britain's history as an economic heavyweight, it seems quite reasonable to suggest that 
economic concerns may well play a role in determining British attitudes toward 
European integration. 
Fortunately, the most recent literature has explored the role of British economic 
concerns in determining British attitudes toward the Euro. For example, Eichenberg 
(l998) identifies British economic performance as a primary variable in explaining 
British attitudes toward the European Union, specifying ". . . GDP, the quarterly inflation 
rate, and a measure of the perceived financial situation of the household as indicators of 
economic performance. " (Eichenberg, 1998, p. 9) Very recently, the literature has 
explored the role of capital markets in British clcctions, claiming, ". . . currency markets 
have become important constraints on elected governments. " (Freeman, Hays and Stix, 
2000, p. 449) Though such research represents a clear departure from previous studies, 
none has systemically explored the role of capital markets in explaining Britain' s 
attitude toward the European common currency. 
The Process 
This study poriends to do just that — to explore the pivotal role of capital 
exchange markets in determining Britain's policy toward the Euro. Though older 
notions — that British Euro-skepticism may be attributed to nationalism and xenophobia 
— may well have merit, this study examines the role of money Speci lically, I posit that 
exchange rates play a significant role m determining whether or not there exists a 
favorable environment in Britain for adoption of the Furo — if the Euro perfortns poorly 
relative to the British Pound, joining the Euro should seem less appealing to Britons; if 
the Euro performs strongly relative to the Pound, joining the Euro should seem more 
appealing to Britons. In essence, this study recognizes the importance of proper timing. 
The most important notion is not whether Britain adopts the common currency, but when 
Britain adopts the common currency. This study assumes that Britons indeed weigh the 
economic benefits of such a drastic change in monetary policy. As a result, Britons' 
attitudes toward the Euro may well be shaped by current economic conditions. Simply, 
adoption of the Euro does not represent Britons' only fear; what also concerns Britons is 
the prospect of a financially disastrous transition to the common currency. Herein, 
exchange rates play a key role in helping Britons assess current economic circumstances, 
for exchange rates provide a simple and quantitative method of score keeping. When 
comparing the Pound's performance to the Euro, Britons need not visit thc mainland; 
daily exchange rate listings in newspapers or outside the neighborhood Bureau de 
Change offer an immediate assessment of thc Pound's performance relative to the Furo. 
Given the nature of the variables under consideration, much of the methodology 
utilized by Perry and Robertson (2000) seems particularly well suited to this study. 
Their study, which examines British party support for the Furopean Union over much of 
the late twentieth century, studies the same political environment of interest to this study. 
Specifically, given the arguable inevitability of Britain's adoption of thc Euro, an 
examination of capital markets must determine how exchange rates affect the political 
environment faced by British political clites; that is: Do the capital markets create an 
environment favorable to pursumg pro-Euro legislation? 
As one might expect, this study accepts several assumptions first adopted by 
Perry and Robertson (2000). First, since I examine the political environment faced by 
party elites, the primary concern of this study is the group of voters to whom the party 
elite are most responsive — fellow party members. This assumption displays a rather 
intuitive notion — that party elites seek support not just from all voters, but also from 
certain types of voters. Second, this study acknowledges the existence of several 
tendencies within each party. Each tendency simply represents different sets of opinion 
among partisans. Unlike factions, tendencies are rather informal and are never 
institutionalized; tendencies represent ". . . a stable set of attitudes rather than a stable set 
of [partisans]. " (Rose, 1980, p. 269) Though informal, tendencies do necessarily precede 
factions. As a result, the most successful party elites must keep abreast of tendency 
groups among partisans. 
Granted, given the myriad issues facing any leader at any given time, partisan 
attitudes toward the European Union may not always represent the most important issue 
tendencies within the British party system. Nevertheless, at a time just after the common 
currency's introduction, the issue of Britain's possible adoption of the Euro" . . pose[s] 
real challenges not only to the politician who must navigate the very difficult waters of 
Britain's continued integration mto the experiment of the European Union, but to social 
scientists as well. " (Perry and Robertson, 2000, p. 3) Simply, British partisan attitudes 
toward the European Union and its common currency seem an issue British politicians 
cannot afford to ignore. 
In the following study, I first acknowledge twelve types of voters/partisans 
(within Britain's two major parties) previously identified by Perry and Robertson (2000). 
Each type of partisan is categorized according to characteristics that align the 
voter/partisan to the issue of the European Union and by implication, Britain's adoption 
of the Euro. Each tendency is then assigned a preference order, which ranges from I to 
12. The preference order simply indicates to what degree each tendency may benefit a 
politician that has as his/her policy strategy ". . . a clear and aggressive orientation toward 
further integrating Britain with the European Union. " (Perry and Robertson, 2000, p. 3) 
In this case, the preference order 12 tendency would prove most beneficial to a pro-EU 
leader, while preference order I designates the least helpful tendency. Given the current 
level of the European Union's development, one may well interpret "further integration" 
as Britain's adoption of' the European Union's common currency. 
This study then discusses the importance of Perry and Robertson's (2000) 
probability weight function (PWF). Of the twelve tendencies, each is assigned a weight 
". 
. . according to how likely the tendency is to contribute to a preferred political strategy" 
(Perry and Robertson, 2000. p. 3) — in this case, a pro-Euro strategy. In essence, Perry 
and Robertson (2000) assign the weights in order to assess the likelihood of success 
should a party leader pursue a pro-FV (and thus pro-Euro) policy strategy; high weights 
signify a high likelihood of' success, while lower weights suggest a low likelihood of 
success. 
Next, the study seeks to establish whether exchange rates indeed played a role in 
fostering (or hindering) a pro-Euro political environment between 1979 and 1996. 
Reliable data limits this study to this eighteen-year period for several reasons. Foremost, 
beginning in l 998, the European Union placed under embargo aII Euro-barometer data 
used to identify the 12 types of voters/partisans. In addition, reliable exchange rata data 
is unavailable for years preceding l 979. As a result, the period l 979-l 996 provides the 
most reliable empirical exploration given the relative dearth of available data. 
Issue Tendencies 
The presence of several tendencies necessitates the identification of spatially 
ordered groups of voters within (or attached to) a political party which would prove most 
likely to affect the direction and momentum of the party's policy priorities. Each group 
should be categorized by specific attributes and attitudes that could bc empirically 
identified. These attributes and attitudes may then define each group's position toward a 
general policy, enabling the placement of each group at a given location along a 
continuum of tendencies. These groups, regardless of their relative proximity to each 
other along this continuum, would nonetheless have in common some degree of 
commitment to a general issue (in this case, Britain's destiny in the European common 
currency). Here, each tendency would hold great implications for the prospects of 
success for pro-Euro policy. 
Employing Euro-baromcter surveys, Perry and Robertson (2000) empirically 
identify twelve tendencies within Britain's major parties (Labour and Conservative) with 
respect to Britain's role in the European Union and, by implication, possible 
Though the Euro was not introduced until 1999, IMF economists are able to accurately calculate the Euro 
exchange rate from t979 For full citation oflMF data used, refer to Works Cited section 
membership in the European common currency. The identification of twelve different 
tendencies necessitates classifying voters/partisans according to three variables. 
First, the respondent is evaluated according to his/her degree of partisanship— 
that is, how strongly the respondent associates him/herself with a particular political 
party. A respondent's degree of partisanship represents a primary concern of any 
politician. When assessing the political environment, politicians must assess the level of 
support for a particular policy strategy. Voters with strong partisan attachments may be 
easily identified as either supporters or opponents, while voters with weak partisan 
attachments, while susceptible to persuasion, pose for politicians a frightening area of 
uncertainty. In deciding whether to pursue any policy strategy, politicians must be able 
to assess the role of partisanship in shaping the political environment. 
Second, thc respondent is evaluated according to his/her attitude toward thc 
European Union — Does the respondent appear strongly pro-EU or vehemently opposed 
to integration? By measuring the respondent's overall mindset regarding European 
unification, this second variable affords a strong indication of the respondent's attitude 
toward adoption of a common currency. Arguably, a voter/partisan that deplores 
European integration altogether is not likely to embrace a common currency. A strong 
supporter of integration, however, would seem most likely to champion adoption of the 
Euro. 
Third, Perry and Robertson (2000) determine thc degree ol' cognitivc 
mobilization expressed by the respondent. Respondents are categorized in relative 
terms, earning a score of either "high" or "low" levels of cognitive mobilization. The 
degree of cognitive mobilization simply measures the respondent's general awareness 
and grasp of the issue at hand: Do they clearly understand the Euro issue and its possible 
consequences? This variable proves particularly important because of the implications 
of a "high" or "low" level of cognitive mobilization. A respondent with a "high" score 
likely wields the knowledge necessary to make an informed opinion. As a result, 
respondents with a "high" score often prove unwavering in their stance. In contrast, 
respondents with "low" cognitive mobilization scores often prove easily swayed by just 
a bit of education; such respondents may well represent "swing votes" and thus affect a 
politician's tactics in a different manner than a respondent with a "high" score. 
Perry and Robertson (2000) then combine respondents' replies to all three 
variables (partisanship, European Union affect and cognitive mobilization) in order to 
specify the twelve aforementioned logical tendencies. ' This process produces a spatial 
continuum that spans all twelve tendencies, from that which affects pro-Euro policy in a 
distinctly negative manner and displays "high" cognitive mobilization, to that which 
affects pro-Euro policy in a distinctly positive manner and displays "high" cognitive 
mobilization. Table I lists each of the twelve tendencies identified by Perry and 
Robertson (2000), along with their designated preference ordering (1-12). 
On one extreme, the pNp tendency (partisan/national-preference) would prove 
most ef'f'ective in hindering a pro-Euro policy strategy. Stnce a pro-Euro politician 
would perceive this tendency as least helpful to his/hcr policy strategy, thc pNp tendency 
receives the lowest prcfercncc order of 1. The pUp (partisan/Union-preference) 
Actually, this study examines 24 tendency grriups — l2 from each of the two malor parties However, 
tlus study is concerned only with tendency (tper, ol which only 12 are idennfied 
Table 1: 
Tendencies and Their Respective Preference Order Rankings 
Tendency 
pNp 
pNo 
vNp 
vNo 
vP 
vA 
pA 
pP 
vUo 
vUp 
pUo 
Preference 
10 
Attribute 
I Votuu 
- CI pmy 
I Vote 
2 CI to psny 
IV i 
. Noi cl I luny 
lopp eltomtmuo 
IV t 
Opp etc S to 
I V 
I V 
2N I I 01 pony 
I V 
I V 
I V 
I V 
I V 
Ft p» 
Logic of Preference Ranking 
Panisanshtp enhances credibility of oppostlion lo pro-Euro snategy 
and high cogninve mobilnauon reduces probabiluies of easy co- 
optalion. Clear oppos i on to EU and unification founded on high 
coyuti e mobtlizahon makes this oler a certain opponent o(a pro. 
Euro straiery with irtuaay no reasonable posstbibty of consent 
Pan sans ip enhances credibtlriy 0 opposmon to pro-Euro srmtegy 
Ho e er, lo cognih e mobilization olrcrs opportunity for co- 
oplalion. Clear opposition to EU and unincalion makes Ibis partisan 
a censin opponenr of a pro-Euro stratebm. though lack ol' slrong 
cognitive mobihzarion and panisanship offer very sbght possibthty 
ofconsem. 
Weak parhsanship reduces credibihty of opposihon lo pro-Euro 
anarcho, bui high cognitive niobtlization and opposilion lo EU 
reduce probab I ties ol' co optation This oter is a near cerrain 
opponent of a pro-Eu o st atebO. though lack of strong cogairtve 
nobil sion and partisamhp oner a ery stghr posstbihiy ol' 
consent 
Weak pan sanship d ces crcdb»ry o opposnion to pro-Euro 
st stegy and lo cobml c moblmt 0 offe oppnnuoily (or co- 
nplal n (. 'lear opposilio Io I. U and unincano akes th i ole a 
near certain opponent ol a pro-Euro slratekgn Ihough lack o(strong 
coputtve mobihzarion and part sanship ofTer shght possibihty of 
consent 
Weak parltsanship reduces credibility of oppostlioii to p o I. uro 
strategy snd lack of clear postlion on issue of EU su(geste little 
opposirion to a pro Euro sirarcgy rhough high cognirmc 
nohb. aims kg si ore II oi early onply This oier may 
be co«lied lo, i p o I. u 0 ilr, tlegy, but lack of pa I sanshp 
eakens bkelihood 01 sutta ninz the consent o er tnne 
str, leg zml lack of clair posihon on issue of LLI plus I op I e 
mobihzstion suggests resistance lo a pro-Euro strategy Lack oF 
panisanship and apalh, make this otcr a reasonably h gh nsk for 
suslammr co ii ni to a pro Euro strategy 
Panisan cffcct pl s lack of clear posnion on issue o( EU. with lo 
cognitive mnh I ai 0 s ks si I lite rcnsian e lo a pro Euro 
snategy a I fl', ». hie pp n ty to n cmnpliance ro a 
p 0 F I slat py Ap ihy eke s co on Inc I of ilw ole 
«k g the oler s nsky bet to ntTer rehable co s I io, i p o I o 
striitegy 
Ihnst fl'ecl plus lack ol'01 z pos l0 t vs ol'FU, Ihhyh 
cog I mnbil ration suggests ressomble oppon iy 10 
tomph, i ie to a p 0-Euro slratep, Parttsansh p, osu ed lo 
dom st posioo 0 L ope thus making oler more S g lo 
consent io a p o-E 0 suategy 
Weak pam . Iop, ml, I og» I mob I at on w skeet 
s ppi r I, pm I 0m si, i*gy 11 i gl cl, i s pp n fo FU aad 
, k ll, i tens iuppo le 0(. p I o 
stmlegy 
si ppo I lor I. tl s d uml ai o, fou sled o h ki g 01 
mob ltzano i;k" th1 ore a new cerlam supponcr of a pro Ltl 
siiales 
Parnssnsh p ~ lone s credibilny of suppon For p o-Euro strarepy 
Howcvcr ak cogmi mobil ry suggests possible s eri k on 
die is c Nmimh I, I a s ppon for EU and n rica»on msk s 
PUp 12 
Pa nsmsh p h sh cowmi mobihzanon and cl a s ppori lo EU 
mak ilus parti sn a iwn s ppori r of a pro Euro strategy thai ts 
nhkely 10 a 
Source. Perry and Robertson (2000k Table I 
tendency represents the other extreme. Given its support of European integration, pro- 
Euro politicians would perceive the pUp tendency as the most helpful in pursuing pro- 
EU policy, and it thus receives the highest preference order of 12. All other tendencies 
(those with preference orders 2-11) reflect voters/partisans with lower levels of cognitive 
mobilization and weaker opinions regarding European integration. While those closest 
to pUp (for example, 8-11) generally support a pro-EU strategy, those closest to pNp 
(for example, 2-4) generally oppose a pro-EU strategy. Partisans in the middle (for 
example, 5-7) remain relatively apathetic with respect to European integration. 
Preference order rankings matter because they directly impact politicians' 
assessment of the political environment. For example, should a pro-Euro politician 
notice a heavy presence of anti-EU tendencies (for example, tendencies with rankings 
ranging from 1-4), that politician would be able to ascertain with certainty that a pro- 
Euro policy strategy would not be prudent considering the anti-integration political 
environment. More than anything, preference order rankings offer the pro-Euro 
politician a method of score-keeping; while a high score (a heavy presence of pro-EU 
tendencies close to 12) would signal an opportunity to actively pursue pro-Euro policy, a 
low score (signified by a heavy presence of anti-EU tendencies close to 1) would suggest 
a time for the politician subdue his/her pro-Euro fervor. Simply, preference order 
rankings make it possible to quantify the politician's pcrccption of thc political 
environment, a perception that indubitably at'fects thc politician's strategies and 
behavior. 
Weights 
In many ways, the British model of parliamentary democracy initiated modern 
notions of representative government. For centuries, Britain's parliamentary institution 
has ensured relative stability for the nation and, as a result, most Britons hold the system 
in high esteem. Indeed, Britain has developed a sort of ". . . cultural affinity to 
parliamentary sovereignty. " (Perry and Robertson, 2000, p. 12) Naturally, modern 
ideals of European integration represent a significant adjustment to the Parliament's 
sovereign powers. By definition, adopting a Europe-wide common currency would 
require that British officials relinquish a great deal of control over monetary policy. 
Adoption of the common currency appears an issue with which any pro-Euro politician 
must tread lightly. 
As a result, any pro-Euro politician must always gauge the possible 
consequences of pursuing such a risky policy strategy. Here, application of Perry and 
Robertson's (2000) probability sveight function (PWF) proves particularly relevant. 
Actually, each of the twelve tendencies receives two "weights". First, each tendency 
receives the preference order ranging from I to 12. Second, each tendency is given a 
value weight (VW) ranging from 0 to 1. The two different weights differ in that 
preference orders simply identify which of thc tendencies would prove most (or least) 
bcncficial to a pro-Euro politician's policy strategy, while value weights predict to what 
extent each tendency would help 1'urther a pro-Euro politician's policy strategy. The 
formula used to calculate the value weight of each tendency may bc represented as: 
'/z 
Value Weight (VW~) = [Pi — (Pi/I 1 )] 
where P, represents the non-weighted preference order of the respective tendency (i. e. , 
pNp=l 2 and pUp=l). ' (Perry and Robertson, 2000, p. 17) 
The formula above produces a value weight for each tendency, ranging from 0 to 
l. Each tendency is weighted according to the degree to which it contributes to pro-Euro 
policy. Since the tendency represented by pNp would not contribute toward pro-Euro 
policy in any way, the tendency receives a value weight of 0. Conversely, the tendency 
represented by pUp would contribute a great deal toward pro-Euro policy, and thus 
receives the highest value weight of 1. All other tendencies receive value weights less 
than 1 and greater than 0. ' 
Since the probability weight function considers the effects of both weights, the 
probability weight function (PWF) represents the product of the two weights: 
pwp = p, (vw), 
where P, denotes the prcfercncc order value for each tendency (1-12, see Table 1 and 
Figure 1), VW is thc value weight assigned to each tendency and PWF represents the 
probability weight function assigned to each tendency. (Perry and Robertson, 2000, p. 
23). Therefore, the pUp lendency (and each voter/partisan therein) has a weighted 
probability of 12 (the product of 12 x 1), while the pNp tendency receives a weighted 
probability of 0 (1 x 0). All other tendencies garner weighted probabilities bctwccn 0 
and 12. Table 2 lists the probability weight functions for each of the twelve tendencies. 
Refer to Table l for P, values of all tendencies 
See Table 2 for a complete ltsttng of each tendency's value weight (VW) 
Table 2: 
Probability Weight Function and Value Weight by Tendency 
Teadency 
pNp 
pNo 
vNp 
vNo 
vp 
vA 
pA 
pP 
vUo 
vUp 
pUo 
pUp 
Pi 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
12 
0 
. 30151 
. 4264 
. 52223 
. 60302 
. 6742 
. 73855 
. 79772 
. 8528 
. 90453 
. 95346 
1 
PWF 
0 
. 60302 
1. 2792 
2, 08892 
3. 0151 
4. 0452 
5. 16985 
6. 38176 
7. 6752 
9. 0453 
10. 48806 
12 
Source: Perry and Robertson (2000), Table 2. 
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Figure 1: Probability Weight Functions and Preference Order Rankin gs 
Source Perry and Robertson (2000), Figure i. 
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Given the nature of this study, the probability weight I'unction proves invaluable 
since both weights must be taken into account. Simply, each of the two weights 
measures a distinct component that helps to create a particular political environment. 
The first weight — preference order ranking — indicates which of the twelve tendencies a 
politician most (or least) prefers to deal with in pursuing a particular policy strategy. In 
this case, pro-Euro politicians most prefer the presence of tendencies with preference 
rankings close to 12; such tendencies form a strong support base for pro-Euro policy. 
Conversely, the pro-Euro politician least prefers tendencies with preference order 
rankings closest to I; such tendencies form a strong base of opposition to pro-Euro 
policy. Simply put, preference order rankings measure to what degree a pro-Euro 
politician would prefer the presence of each tendency. 
Howcvcr, the second weight — the value weight (VW) — measures another 
phenomenon altogether. In essence, the value weight measures the prospect of pro-Euro 
policy not from the perspective of the politician, but from the standpoint of the tendency 
itself. Specifically, the value weight assesses to what degree each tendency would 
contribute to promoting pro-Euro policy. Naturally, the tendency that most strongly 
opposes European integration would not promote pro-Euro policy in any way. As a 
result, it receives a value weight of 0. Conversely, the most pro-EU tendency receives 
the highest value weight of 1 since it seems most likely to promote pro-Euro policy. 
Basically, value weights gauge to what degree each tendency helps to promote pro-Euro 
policy. 
16 
Indeed, each of the two weights measures a distinct component that helps to 
create a particular political environment. In this study's quest for a pro-Euro political 
environment, the probability weight function offers particular insight to the likelihood of 
pro-Euro policy by combining the effects of both the preference order rankings and 
value weights. In particular, the probability weight function affords the study a 
quantitative assessment of the political environment. 
Findings and Analysis 
The existence of the probability weight function proves essential in assessing the 
role of capital markets on pro-Euro policy in Britain. Specifically, the availability of 
two quantitative variables — exchange rate data and the probability weight function— 
makes it possible to empirically evaluate the merit of an essential premise: that capital 
markets play a role in shaping tendencies, which then contribute to the overall political 
environment in Britain. In turn, the political environment determines the likelihood of 
politicians pursuing a pro-Euro policy strategy. 
Based on this premise, a first hypothesis emerges: that exchange rates indeed 
play a sigmficant role in creating a pro- or anti-Euro political environment in Britain. 
By helping to shape the tendencies with the two major British parties, exchange rates 
indirectly determine whether or not pro-Euro politicians are able to confidently pursue a 
pro-Euro policy strategy. 
However, this first hypothesis requires a bit of rcfincmcnt. Specifically, the time 
period under investigation — 1979-1996 — demands that we consider the effects of the 
European Union's development on British partisans* perceptions. The period 1979-1996 
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represents a period of dramatic development for the European Union. As a result, this 
study must consider the effects of European Union milestones. For example, the year 
1986 represents a pivotal year in the development of the European Union. In 1986, 
Britain, along all other members of the European Union, reached an accord with the 
Single European Act. By any measure, the Single European Act heralded a clear 
acceleration in the development of the European Union. For many Britons, the Single 
European Act's passage cemented the notion that European integration (which would 
culminate in the introduction of a common currency) was poised to take the leap from an 
ideal to a reality. The Single European Act's passage left an indelible mark on all 
Britons. As one scholar notes, "In retrospect, the years 1986 and 1987 resemble the eye 
of the storm, . . . succeeded by a rapid acceleration of European integration. " (Dinan, 
1999, p. 121) If indeed the process of European integration may bc described as a 
"storm", little doubt the events of 1986 left Britons acutely aware of the implications of 
European integration and of the European Umon's ultimate goal of adopting a common 
currency. 
It follows that the importance of the Single European Act's passage necessitates 
a second hypothesis: that we should expect exchange rates to play a even greater role in 
creating a pro- or anti-Euro political environment after 1986. If indeed 1986 represents a 
quantum leap in European integration (in which eventual creation of a common currency 
had always been a primary goal), it should emerge as a year after which the implications 
of a common currency became a particularly salient issue for Britons. 
In order to evaluate the two aforementioned hypotheses, I first isolate the 
exogenously determined (independent) variable — the exchange rate. Using exchange 
rate data provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the exchange rate of 
interest tracks how many European Currency Units (ECU's, or Euros) one would receive 
in exchange for one British Pound on open capital markets. (i. e. , the ECU/Pound ratio) 
Though the IMF records exchange rate data on a monthly basis, the Euro-barometer data 
utilized by Perry and Robertson (2000) is available only on an annual basis. As a result, 
I calculate the mean annua/ exchange rate for each of the 18 years in question (See 
Table 3 for annual values). This manipulation of the data — using monthly values to 
calculate an annual value — proves particularly essential; to obtain usable results, the 
study must express both exchange rate data and Euro-barometer data in comparable 
units. 
Data provided by Perry and Robertson's (2000) methodology also requires a bit 
of manipulation. Using the same Euro-barometer survey data, this study requires that we 
ascertain the political environment over the entire year. In any given year, there exist a 
total of 24 tendency groups — I 2 from each of the two major political parties. In order to 
determine the level of pro-Euro support during each year among the two parties, we 
must first determine whether the distribution of voters/partisans helps to create a pro- or 
anti-Euro environment. 
If, for example, a large portion of the voters/partisans makes up the pUp 
tendency, then we may expect a relatively pro-Euro political environment. On the 
contrary, if most voters/partisans compose the pNp (and other anti-European Union) 
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tendency, we may expect a decidedly anti-Euro political environment. In order to 
determine the proportion of the voters/partisans that prefer pro- or anti-Euro policy, we 
calculate the proportion of voters/partisans that make up each tendency. That is, we 
divide the number of voters/partisans in each tendency by the sum of all voters/partisans 
in each party. This produces a percentage for each tendency. We then multiply this 
percentage (or share of voters/partisans that occupy each tendency) by the probability 
weight function for each tendency. We then sum these products for each of the 24 
tendency groups. The sum for each year yields variable S, " which provides particular 
insight into the political environment of each year. A relatively high S would indicate 
that a large share of voters/partisans were categorized among pro-European Union (and 
thus pro-Euro) tendencies. Conversely, a relatively low S would indicate that a large 
share of voters/partisans harbored anti-European Union (and consequently anti-Euro) 
sentiments. The S values for each of the 18 years in question are depicted in Table 3. 7 
Next, annual S values are plotted against the annual exchange rate over the 
period 1979-1996. Though such a test may appear relatively simple, the range of 
relevant tests was limited largely by the availability of reliable data. For example, the 
relatively small number of years in question (N=18) hampered the reliability of time- 
scries analyses. However, the test utilized proves particularly relevant because it 
portrays the direct effect of exchange rates in determining thc level of pro- or anti-Euro 
For an example of S value calculation, see Appendix; Calculation of S Value. 
Euro-barometer data was not available for the years 19SO, 1990, 1991, or 1995. As a result, the S-values 
for each of these years were extrapolated by finding the mean of the S-values of the years imniediately 
before and after For example, the S'-value for 19SO equals the mean of the S-values for 1979 and 1981. 
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Table 3: 
Average Annual Exchange Rate and S Value by Year 
Year 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Average Annual Exchange Rate 
(ECU/Pound Ratio) 
1. 568 
1. 688 
1. 818 
1. 780 
I. 711 
1. 686 
I. 703 
1. 485 
1. 418 
1. 511 
1. 476 
1. 402 
1. 425 
1. 354 
1. 283 
1. 288 
1. 203 
1. 283 
S Value 
1. 400458 
1. 406065 
1. 411671 
1. 351439 
1. 492564 
1. 464565 
1. 453156 
1. 458315 
1. 503874 
1. 421597 
1. 551687 
1. 459964 
1. 414102 
1. 368240 
1. 436062 
1. 379923 
1. 360545 
I 341166 
support among British voters/partisans. Results are depicted in Figure 2. 
Should the hypothesis hold credence, we should seek a certain relationship: as 
the Euro performs poorly relative to the British Pound, joining the Euro should seem less 
appealing to Britons; if the Euro performs strongly relative to the Pound, joining the 
Furo should seem more appealing to Britons. In other words, we may expect an 
increasing S value during periods in which ECU/Pound ratio decreases, and a decreasing 
S value during periods in which ECU/Pound ratio increases; that is, we expect to notice 
an inverse relationship between S and the ECU/Pound ratio. 
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Figure 2: Ann//a/ Exchange Rate and S values /i&r the Period /979- /996 
Though early years (at left in Figure 2) fail to depict a clear relationship, the year 
1986, which heralds adoption of the Single European Act, clearly rcprcsents a pivotal 
turning point. indeed, in the right-hand portion of Figurc 2 (which depicts thc period 
after 1986), a decidedly inverse relationship appears as predicted. As the Euro flounders 
with respect to the British Pound, causing thc ECU/Pound ratio to increase, support for 
European integration dwindles, causing thc S value to decrease, and vice versa. Without 
a doubt, passage of the Single European Act initiated an era in which Britons began to 
assess their economic situation in an unprecedented manner. 
Indeed, lmdings suggest that both hypotheses hold credence. First, a clearly 
inverse relationship has emerged between the Pound's success and pro-EU sentiments in 
Britain. When the Pound outperforms thc Euro, Britons become disinterested in 
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increased integration with mainland Europe; when the Euro exhibits potential for 
success, Britons begin to acquiesce with respect to increased monetary integration. 
Without a doubt, whether or not the average voter/partisan actively follows exchange 
rates, capital markets exert real influence in creating a pro- or anti-Euro political 
environment in Britain. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the role of capital markets in shaping the 
British political environment becomes strikingly obvious after passage of the Single 
European Act in 1986. As European integration developed from a mere notion to an 
inevitability during the mid-I 980's, exchange rates began to play an indelible role in 
molding the British political landscape. 
Conclusion 
While this study has demonstrated that capital markets exert a great deal of 
influence in shaping the pro- or anti-Euro political environment in Britain, thc role of 
Britain in the European common currency shall no doubt contmue to pester British 
politicians for years to come. Though both of Britain's major parties recognize that 
Britain will remain an important member of the European Union (Perry and Robertson, 
2000, p. 28), the degree of further integration — specifically, Britain's adoption of the 
Euro — remains a mystery. 
Nonetheless, based on this study's results, one may reasonably assume that any 
policy strategy designed to move Britain in the direction of adopting the European 
Union's common currency will in no small part depend upon the performance of the 
Euro relative to the Pound on the world's capital markets. In an era of globalization, in 
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which governments are increasingly held accountable by all things financial, it comes as 
little surprise that global capital markets should wield a heavy hand in shaping Britain' s 
role (or lack thereof) in Europe's most recent monetary experiment. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the influence of capital markets presents the pro-Euro 
British politician with a curious paradox: though the average voter stands to gain from a 
strong British Pound, the strong Pound has surfaced as an essential factor in creating an 
anti-Euro political environment. As a result, the pro-Euro politician must choose 
between perceived long-term prosperity (as a member of the common currency) and a 
certain degree of short-term suffering (caused by a weak Pound), which may very well 
cost the pro-Euro politician re-election. In essence, the Pound's success represents pro- 
Euro policy's failure. It is this paradox of success that the pro-Euro British politician 
must navigate for the foreseeable future. Most importantly, it is this paradox of success 
that will play an indelible role in determining Britain's future role in the European 
expenment of monetary integration. 
24 
WORKS CITED 
Anderson, Christopher J. and Karl C. Kaltenthaler. "Europeans and their Money: 
Explaining Public Support for the Common European Currency. " State U of New 
York and Rhodes College, 1998. 
Bohrer, Robert E. II and Guy D. Whitten. "Party Positions and Citizen Support for 
European Union in the United Kingdom, 1973-89. " Texas A&M U, 1997. 
Dinan, Desmond. Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999. 
Eichenberg, Richard C. "Measurement Matters: Cumulation in the Study of Public 
Opinion and European Integration. " Tufts U, 1998. 
Freeman, John R. , Hayes, Jude C. and Helmut Stix. "Democracy and Markets: The Case 
of Exchange Rates. " American Jour. nal of Political Science 44 (July 2000): 449- 
68. 
Monticelli, Carlo and Luca Papi. European Integration, Monetary Co-ordination, and 
the Demand for Money. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996: 
Perry, Robert L. and John D. Robertson. "The Changing Contours of British Party 
Support for the European Union: Tendencies, Prospects, and the Frame, 1976- 
1996. " U of Texas-Permian Basin and Texas A&M U, 2000. 
Rose, Richard. Politics in England: An Interpretation for the l980s. London: Faber and 
Faber, 1980. 
Supplemental Sources Consulted 
Franklin, Mark, Marsh, Michael and Laurcn McLarcn. "Uncorking the Bottle: Popular 
Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht. ". Journal of 
Common Market Studies 32 (December 1994): 455-472. 
Gabcl, Matthew and Harvey D. Palmer. Understanding Variation in Public Support for 
European Integration "European Journal of Political Research 27 (1995): 3-19. 
Garty, John. "The British Conservative Party: Divisions Over European Policy. " West 
Eur opean I'oli ties 18 (October 1995): 179-189. 
Haahr, Jens Henrik. "European Integration and the Left in Britain and Denmark. " 
Journal of Common Market Studies 30 (March 1992): 77-100. 
International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM, Washington, D. C. : International Monetary 
Fund, 2000. 
Jordan, Grant and William A. Maloney. "Group-Party Relations in Britain. " U of 
Aberdeen, 1998. 
Kotlowski, Dean J. , ed. The European Union: from Jean Monnet to the Euro. Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 2000. 
Lofthouse, Richard A. "Britain, New Labour, Europe and the Euro: Current Policy and 
Historical Perspectives. " Yale U, 1998. 
Lord, Christoper. "Sovereign or Confused? The 'Great Debate' about British Entry to 
the European Community 20 Years On. " Journal of Common Market Studies 30 
(December 1992): 419-436. 
Scott, David J. and Marco R. Steenbcrgen. "Parties, Constituents, and the EU: The 
Dynamics of Representation and Cue Taking. " U of North Carolina at Chapel 
Hill, 1998. 
Webb, Paul. "Attitudinal Clustering Within British Parliamentary Elitcs: Patterns of 
Intra-Party and Cross-Party Alignment. " 8'est European politics 20 (October 
1997): 89-110. 
26 
APPENDIX: CALCULATION OF S VALUE 
The probability weight function (PWF) values calculated by Perry and Robertson (2000) 
require manipulation in order to assess the effect of the ECU/Pound ratio (annual 
exchange rate) on the pro- or anti-Euro political environment in Britain. 
Table A-1 tracks the calculation of S for 1979. As described in the text, we calculate a 
share of party (8) value in order to determine the percentage of each party's membership 
that makes up each of the 12 tendencies. This 6 value is then multiplied by the PWF 
value to reflect the relative presence of each tendency, producing [PWF x 8] values 
shown at right below. Then, the sum of all [PWF x 8) values from both parties is 
calculated to produce an S value, shown at bottom right in bold type. S values for all 
other years (1980-96) are calculated using the same procedure. 
Table A-I: 
Calculation of S Value 
Party 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
Labour 
I. abour 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Cense(vative 
Conservative 
Conscrvativc 
Collsclvatlvc 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Conservative 
Cot(secretive 
P( 
I 
2 
7 
8 
11 
12 
3 
4 
6 
9 
10 
3 
4 
6 
5 
9 
10 
I 
2 
7 
8 
II 
12 
PWF 
0 
0. 30151 
0. 73855 
0. 79772 
0. 95346 
I 
0. 4264 
0. 52223 
0. 6742 
0 60302 
0. 8528 
0. 90453 
0. 4264 
0. 52223 
0 6742 
0 60302 
0. 8528 
0. 90453 
0 
0 30151 
0 73855 
0 79772 
0. 95346 
I 
Tendency 
pNp 
pNo 
pA 
pp 
pUo 
pUp 
vNp 
vNo 
vp 
vUo 
vUp 
vNp 
vNo 
vA 
vp 
vUo 
vUp 
pNp 
pNo 
pA 
pp 
pUo 
pUp 
Number 
of Voter 
10 
29 
35 
32 
8 
25 
16 
40 
53 
28 
16 
24 
13 
35 
44 
38 
26 
46 
7 
10 
21 
27 
29 
44 
0 
0 02767 
0. 081801 
0. 080782 
0. 024138 
0. 079114 
0. 02159 
0. 066105 
0. 113078 
0. 053432 
0. 04318 
0. 068698 
0. 016304 
0. 053759 
0. 087249 
0. 067396 
0. 065214 
0 122378 
0 
0. 008868 
0. 045616 
0 063348 
0. 081325 
0. 129412 
0. 03 1646 
0. 091772 
0. 110759 
0. 101266 
0. 025316 
0. 079114 
0. 050633 
0. 126582 
0 167722 
0. 088608 
0. 050633 
0 075949 
0. 038235 
0. 102941 
0 129412 
0. 111765 
0 076471 
0 135294 
0. 020588 
0 029412 
0. 061765 
0 079412 
0. 085294 
0. 129412 
Share of 
Party (6) 1(WF x 6 S Value 
1. 400458 
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